Abstracts of Selected Works
	Lo,  Norva Y. S.   Is Hume Inconsistent?, in C. Pigden (ed.) Hume on Motivation and Virtue (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): pp. 57-79.
	The paper rejects internalist readings of David Hume on moral motivation -- which attribute to him the position that there is some necessary connection between morality and motivation. I argue that the internalist reading of Hume should be rejected on three counts. First, it is inconsistent with Hume's own metaethical analysis of morals. Second, there is textual evidence showing that Hume hmself admits the possibility of the split between moral judgment on the one hand and moral sentiment and action on the other. Third, I put forward a non-internalist reading of Hume on moral motivation, which is more plausible than the internalist readings, in terms of consistency with both Hume's metaethical analysis of morals and his anti-rationalism.
	Lo,  Y. S.   Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View. Inquiry 49 (2006): 123-147.  (ERA ranking: A)
	The paper advances a Humean metaethical analysis of "intrinsic value" -- a notion fundamental in moral philosophy in general and particularly so in environmental ethics. The analysis reduces an object's moral properties (e.g., its value) to the empirical relations between the object's natural properties and people's psychological dispositions to respond to them. Moral properties turn out to be both objective and subjective, but in ways compatible with, and complementary to, each other. Next, it argues that one of the most useful resources from Hume for nonanthropocentrism is his account of justice as an artificial virtue, which is a plausible model for the internalization of various environmentally friendly conventions and the creation of environmental values. Finally, the paper concludes that any Humean account of intrinsic value is empiricist all the way down.
	Lo,  Y. S.   On Lewis on Egoism De Se and De Dicto. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2002): 345-349.  (ERA ranking: A* )
	In this article I examine David Lewis's distinction between egoism de se and egoism de dicto, and demonstrate why egoism de se is the paradigm form of egoism.
	Lo,  Y. S.   The Land Ethic and Callicott's Ethical System (1980-2001): An Overview and Critique. Inquiry 44 (2001): 331-358.  (ERA ranking: A)
	This article analyzes the evolution of the land ethic re-presented by J. Baird Callicott over the last two decades under pressure from the charge of misanthropy and ecofascism. It also traces the development of Callicott's own ethical system, and examines its most current phase both in itself and in relation to his other theoretical commitments, including his particular version of moral monism, and his communitarian critique of egalitarianism. It concludes that Callicott's communitarianism is by itself insufficient to fund an adequate environmental ethic, and that for the sake of self-consistency he should either discard his moral monism or else further revise his ethical system.
	Lo,  Yeuk-Sze.   Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature As Subject. Environmental Ethics 21 (1999): 247-266.  (ERA ranking: A)
	It has been argued that human restoration of nature is morally problematic because artificially restored natural entities are artifacts, which are ontologically different from natural entities and, hence, essentially devoid of the moral standing that natural entities have. I discuss the alleged assimilation of restored natural entities to artifacts, and argue that it does not follow from the ontological differences, if any, between the artifactual and the natural that the former is morally inferior to the latter. This defense against the devaluation of restored natural entities is aimed at narrowing the ethical gap between the wild and the tamed, which is often endorsed by ecocentric environmental ethics.